S & T Notes - issue 135

Loc. 2 (before)


An obituary to location cupboard 2 - struck down in its prime by the Iron Fairy. No flowers by request.

SIGNALLING NOTES - Chris. Hall

The editor has said that it time to put pen to paper again (well actually I know that I've got a week or two to produce the article when the next magazine thuds through the door, so I'll take up the thread from the last article from the end of August 2000 up to the middle of February 2001. Christmas has just passed - a month of Santa train running when we can spend most of the day at the weekend between Highley and Bridgnorth undisturbed by trains. Except for the Pee-Weigh of course but they only tend to be around on the Sunday. We can't do much work south of Highley, as the train service is so frequent, so it's time to do some of the indoor jobs, which fits in with the usual weather.

Renewals programme

The renewal of location 2 during S&T week in July 2000 was described in the last article. A works and testing plan was drawn up for the changeover and commissioning in November 2000 and a team of five (John Phillips, Dave Wittamore, Chris Hall, Steve Curtis and Dick Lewis) started the work and took possession of the north end of Bridgnorth on 28 November. As soon as the Locomotive Department saw that we had started they asked to put 813 into the boiler shop siding to be taken away by road. We allowed 813 through our possession and once the Locomotive Department realised access to the boiler shop was possible they didn't bother us again.

The existing cable from location 1 (a rather grubby telecomms cable) had to be disconnected from the old location 2, pulled back and rethreaded through the new cable duct to the new location 2. However the wound that the cable had suffered in a tussle with the CS&TE and an angle grinder (see last issue) became fatal when the cable (which was under two inches of water at the time) was meggered at an optimistic 1000V. Acceptance figures of around 20 MOhm are usually quoted but the initial reading was considerably less than this, then it was noted that the same reading was obtained with the leads of the megger shorted together. A new 'temporary' length of 10 core signalling cable was therefore laid out to replace the whole of the damaged cable. This will be fine (until the new troughing can be installed, which we plan to do in January/February 2001) if our friends in the Locomotive Department can refrain from covering the cable in hot ashes.

The old track circuit connections were removed and the cables recovered and scrapped. This left the wrecked shell of the old location cupboard forlorn and disconnected. A few minutes later there was no trace of it just some disturbed earth. This was a poignant moment for the Department - although a few location cupboards had been renewed twice since the early 1980's, the replacement of location 2 is the last in the renewal programme which has brought all location cupboards up to the current standards. The Department therefore celebrated the occasion in the normal way on the Saturday when the work had been completed.

Commissioning of a new location cupboard involves a lot more work than you may imagine. Prior to the day when the new location is brought into use and the old location is decommissioned, a detailed Testing and Commissioning Plan must be produced by the Tester-in-Charge, who, for the job, was David Wittamore.

The Plan complies with the format developed by the old B.R. and accepted by Railtrack for the testing and commissioning of new signalling equipment and systems. This compels the Tester to follow a sequence of actions to ensure that every single wire, cable and piece of equipment is tested and proved before it is brought into use. We have been using this rigorous testing and commissioining process for about the last fifteen years.

An arm repeater for the double disc to be installed at Bewdley North in place of the existing single disc has to be designed and manufactured and the Departmental photographer has captured some pictures of the double disc at Bridgnorth to prove that it can be done (and to assist the design of the necesary fixings)! The 'outside work' at North is proceeding steadily as part of 'phase two' of the North box work to bring working Distants into use.

Defect rectification

Kidderminster

A sling on no. 58 (Down Loop Advanced Starting) signal failed and has been replaced. Pressure is mounting on the Department to move this signal as it is preventing the Pee-Weigh Department from filling all available space at Kidderminster with sidings.

The circuit controller on the platform 2 motor points (no. 47) was adjusted and the false lever tail (bolted on the back of the lever) which drives the circuit controller was also adjusted which should have (finally) eradicated the problems previously reported.

The acceptance lever has been reported as tight between the reverse and normal check positions - it was cleaned but remained tight from normal to reverse at the 'B' position and will need to be stripped down, cleaned and adjusted probably during out-of-traffic hours. During January and February it was stripped down and cleaned (twice) and it is now 'as sweet as a nut'. The problem was finally traced to adjustment of the lock dog which proved critical and required a complete strip down to adjust it by half a turn.

Bewdley South

Complaints from signalmen that the 'A' end (nearer the box) of 23 points (Down Main to Down Yard) were becoming difficult to bolt reverse were addressed by adjusting the 'B' end, which were closing up before the 'A' end and thus preventing the 'A' end from closing fully. If the switch rail does not close up tightly to the stock rail, the facing point lock cannot be engaged and only a small tolerance of less than 3mm is permitted.

A problem was reported that the acceptance lever at Bewdley South could not be restored after the second driving school returned from Kidderminster on Wednesday of October half term week although all track circuit indications were showing clear. Pilotman working was introduced and S&T attended the following day. A process of elimination started with the Kidderminster end where all was in order and the 50V feed from Kidderminster to Bewdley was present. The feed was absent at Bewdley (hence no release to restore the acceptance lever) and thus indicated a cable fault. All was in order at the Kidderminster distant but not at the Bewdley South Down Distant (BS0) and the fault was thus traced to a cable fault in the 10 core cable between these points. Cores 3 and 4 of the cable were found to have a direct short but other cores appeared satisfactory.

For most of this distance the cable is buried in the ballast in Bewdley Tunnel so it didn't look too promising at this stage. However application of Ohms law to the measured loop resistance gave a rough estimate of the position of the fault, about 50 yards in rear of BS0. Our Telecoms section consultant was called upon on the Saturday afternoon to pinpoint the fault more accurately and used a pulse echo tester. This didn't work but before the Signals section had a chance to ridicule these new fangled devices that didn't work they obtained a more complicated and even newer fangled device (called a 'cat') that did work and tied it down to between 20 and 25 yards from the location cupboard.

The cable was cut just beyond this point and a new section of cable to the location cupboard was jointed and terminated. Examination of the affected cable showed there was no external evidence of damage.

Subsequently the cable was forensically examined by the Department's expert who has asked to remain anonymous in this article and the Carr report is eagerly awaited. About 2' 3¾" from the termination in the location cupboard at the Down Distant the cores were found to be very compressed, still damp and still shorted together. As the armouring of the cable was carefully removed the pressure released and the resistance increased as the cores relaxed. There was no external damage at the location of the failure. The cable must have been stretched during installation five years ago where it was threaded around a tight bend through a pipe into the location and the recent heavy rain had penetrated sufficiently to cause the fault between the two cores.

A fault was reported on 18 November that the up main block was dropping to 'normal' when the home signal was cleared. On investigation the fault had cleared but a month later the up main block failed completely. The fuse had blown and the holding coil had gone open circuit - these faults were repaired on 1 January.

Bewdley North

A lot of work is going on quietly here to provide for additional signalling functions associated with the box rewire (no predictions for when in 2001 this will happen) - new signal wire wheels have been installed as well as double wheels in place of single wheels. Problems with the electric lock on no. 4 signal (Up Main to Back Platform Inner Home) were overcome by cleaning and adjusting the lock.

A track circuit failure was reported on 25 November when 8T was showing occupied when clear (SOWC) but was also intermittently failing to release the electric locks on levers 8 and 31 whilst showing clear. This was giving the signalman some difficulty as his instructions for operating the sealed release (to allow no. 6 points to be unbolted and moved) state that it will only release the lever when all conditions are correct except that the track circuit indicates occupied (which it wasn't).

The instructions state "Signalmen are reminded that use of the Sealed Emergency Releases is permitted only when the lever concerned is locked by reason of the controlling Track Circuit failing to shew 'clear' when no train or vehicle is standing on the affected portion of the line. Their use in any other circumstances is irregular and serious notice will be taken of any misuse. Additionally signalmen are reminded that operation of the Release Plunger has no effect at all if the controlling Track Circuit indicates 'clear'.".

Normally the track circuit relay (TR) controls a track repeat relay (TPR) which will either be energised (clear) or not (occupied). In this case the TR is in the signalbox and there is no need of a TPR. The TR has four sets of contacts (one of which provides the indication) which may not quite make up at the same time. This appeared to be caused by very wet track conditions causing the relay to be on the point of deenergising but could have been caused by a faulty TR (or, as subsequently proved to be the case, by a faulty insulated rail joint) so it was changed for a serviced spare.

The fault on 31 electric lock persisted and a seperate fault was traced to 8LCC (the lock proving contacts on no.8 electric lock) which was cleaned and all then appeared in order.

However on 1 January 5T failed SOWC. Investigation showed that the bonding through the length of the track circuit was in good order but it was noted that the rail to rail voltage was low (0.12V, normally 0.3V). As an up train approached and occupied 2T, it was noted that 5TR picked up and this confirmed our suspicion that the IRJ between 2T/5T or 5T/8T was breaking down. The Pee-Weigh were therefore requested to change the IRJ - this was done on 3 January clearing the fault. The associated track circuits were tested satisfactorily on 6 January. Electrical faults are always difficult to trace when there's more than one fault, especially when one of the faults is intermittent.

Highley

There have been several reports of a problem at Highley where the long section token to Bridgnorth has been correctly withdrawn but no release has been obtained on the Down Starting Signal. When examined by the S&T the fault has obstinately refused to present itself so we have not been able to fix it. It only seems to appear at the beginning of the day and may be related to dampness.

The forged bar which holds the detection slide casting a fixed distance from the stock rail of the yard exit points fractured and was temporarily repaired. A permanent repair was effected on 17 December which involved forging a square end onto the relevant fittings so that the length can be made up using point rodding. The Christmas running provided a good opportunity to complete this repair.

Bridgnorth

A problem which caused difficulty in disengaging the facing point lock on no. 12 points after a train had arrived in platform 2 was repaired the same day. The FPL, point and associated signals were disconnected. S&T were on a train to Highley at the time, overheard a garbled conversation, got off the train (which was at Bewdley) and boarded a fast car to Bridgnorth to attend to the fault. Two broken signal wires (on nos. 4 and 15) and a sling caught on the pulley shaft under the box (no. 18) complete the picture at Bridgnorth.

Routine maintenance

The usual, mundane but essential routine maintenance, testing and adjusting equipment to ensure that it continues to operate reliably, continues in accordance with a maintenance schedule.

Single Line Worked by Acceptance Lever

The single line between Bewdley South and Kidderminster is worked under Acceptance Lever Regulations (all the other single lines on the railway are worked under the Electric Train Token Regulations) and I thought that an S&T perspective of how this operates would be my 'chosen subject' for explanation in this issue. The section is track circuited throughout and the Signalman may give 'Train out of Section' for a fully fitted train once the relevant track circuits have operated in sequence and the single line is clear, often before he can actually see the train.

In the box each end of the section, an acceptance lever is provided which releases electrically the section signal lever at the other end of the section. The acceptance lever is attached to a device called a circuit controller and the acceptance lever can only be reversed if the single line track circuits between the section signals are clear, the acceptance lever at the other end of the section is proved normal and if the arm repeater on the home signal(s) that would be approached by the train is proved in the Danger position (the occupation key must also be in place 'in position 1' in the release instrument in South box).

The section signal at the other end of the section may now be cleared, provided that the single line track circuits remain clear, for a single pull (i.e. once it has been moved out of the normal position, it will become locked as soon as it is replaced to the normal position again).

When the section signal lever is pulled then as soon as the arm repeater on the section signal loses its 'On' indication, the approach locking on that signal will be activated (approach locking was described in issue 132).

The acceptance lever can be replaced at any time, thus removing the release on the section signal, as it may be necessary to prevent the approach of a train in an emergency, but there is an electric lock which will stop it short of the normal position (just short of the normal position so that no mechanical locking is released). This lock will always be free in normal circumstances but will be locked unless the single line track circuits are free, the occupation key is in its correct place and the section signal at the other end of the section is free of approach locking (F.O.A.L.). This means that the signal arm is proved at Danger and the approach locking has been released.

The only mechanical locking provided on the acceptance lever is that it is locked normal unless the section signal lever is normal. Conversely the section signal lever is locked normal unless the acceptance lever is normal. The Driver's authority to enter the section is therefore given by clearance of the section signal proving that the section is empty and that no train has been given permission to approach from the opposite direction.

Loc. 2 (after)


The new location 2 at completion of commissioning.

issue 134 -- return to main page -- issue 136.